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Abstract
The concept of Communication-proof equilibrium is extended to infinite games. To that end we make use of 
abstract stable sets as defined by Greenberg in his Theory of Social Situations. 
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1. Introduction
The concept of Communication-proof equilibrium, Com-PE, was proposed in Ferreira (1996) for
finit games. Here we present its extension to infinit games using the approach in Greenberg (1989).
To understand this definitio think of a group of people that arrives at an agreement and then must
leave the room. The problem is that, when a player leaves, he may rightly suspect that the remaining
players will change their actions taking as given his own strategy. A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium,
Coalition-PNE, (Bernheim et al., 1987, from now on B,P&W) is an arrangement that will not be
changed regardless of the order of exit. To modify the definitio for extensive form games one needs
to take into consideration not only the usual problems of time consistency but the renegotiation issues
as well. In particular, if part of the deviation can be observed, the possibility of a reaction by the
opponents cannot be ruled out. Unlike the definitio of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium,
PCoalition-PNE, provided by B,P&W, the concept of Com-PE reflect these points and can be
regarded as an extension of both Coalition-PNE and renegotiation-proof equilibria.
*Corresponding author. Tel.: 134-91-624-9580; fax: 134-91-624-9575.
E-mail address: jlferr@eco.uc3m.es (J.L. Ferreira).
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3. Extending Com-PE to infinit games
This section follows the approach by Greenberg (1989) where the stable sets are used to extend
recursive definition to the infinit case.
A von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract system (AS) is a pair (D, s ) where D is an abstract set
and s is a dominance relation ( f s d will be read as ‘f dominates d’). Let (D, s ) be an abstract
system, and let f [D. The dominion of f, denoted by D( f ), is the set D( f )5 hd [D u f s dj. That
is, D( f ) consists of all elements of D that f dominates, according to the dominance relation s .
Similarly, for a subset F ,D, the dominion of F, denoted by D(F ), is the set D(F )5 <
hD( f ) u f [Fj. That is, an element d in D belongs to D(F ) if it is dominated by some element in
F. A set F ,D is a von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable set (ASS) for the system (D, s ) if
F 5D\D(F ).
Let G be a multi-stage game. Inspired by Definitio 2 an abstract system (D, s ) is introduced. Let
the elements of the abstract set consist of a coalition, a subgame and a strategy profil in this
subgame,
h hD 5 h(C, g , s) u C ,N, C ± 5, h [H, s [ S j
hwhere S is the set of strategy profile in the subgame after h; and let the domination relation be
k hdefine as follows: (B, g , y)s (C, g , s) if and only if either
h k k1. k [H and k ± h: B ,N, s 5 y , y s s or2B 2B B
k k2. k 5 h: B ,C, s 5 y , y s s .2B 2B B
The next proposition (the proof of which is just the proof of the lemmas after it) relates the ASS of (D,
s ) with the definitio of Com-PE for finit games and allows for a definitio applicable to infinit
games.
Proposition 1. Let K be an ASS of (D, s ); then, for finit games, we have that for all h [H, C ,N
h h h1and s [ S; (C, g , s)[K if and only if (s (t(h)), s ) is a Com-PE in the subgame g /s (t(h)). InC 2C
particular, when C 5N and h 5 5, Com-PE(G )5 hs u (N, G, s)[Kj.
h h1Lemma 1. For all h [H, C ,N and s [ S; if (s (t(h)), s ) is a Com-PE in g /s (t(h)) then there areC 2C
k k1no B, k and x such that (x (t(k)), x ) is a Com-PE in g /x (t(k)) and neither of the following isB 2B
satisfied
h k k(i) k [H , B ,N, s 5 x , x s s2B 2B B
k k(ii) k 5 h, T ,C, s 5 x , x s s2T 2T T
Proof. The proof is by induction in the number of stages t. If t 5 1, the proof reduces to show that for
all C ,N, s is a Com-PE (5Coalition-PNE) in G /s implies that no B ,N and x [ S exist suchC 2C
that x is Coalition-PNE in G /x and B ,C, x 5 s , x s s; but this comes from Lemma 1 inB 2B 2B 2B B
Greenberg (1989).
Assume that the Lemma has been proved for games with strictly less than t stages and prove it now
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h h h1for t . 1. If (s (t(h)), s ) is a Com-PE in the restricted game g /s (t(h)) and k [H and if k ± hC 2C
k kthen s is a Com-PE in g by definitio of Com-PE. Apply the induction hypothesis to get that no
k h1B ,N and x [ S exist such that (x (t(k)), x ) is a Com-PE in g /x (t(k)) with x 5 s andB 2B 2B 2B
k kx s s . Finally, for the case k 5 h, suppose that there exist a coalition B ,N and a strategy profilB
h h 1 h1 1x [ S such that (x (t(h)),x ) is a Com-PE in g /x (t(h)), then x (the restriction of x in g ) is aB 2B
h k k1Com-PE in g ; if B ,C, s 5 x and x s s then s was not a Coalition-PNE restricted to2B 2B B
S9 5 hs [ S u s induces a Com-PE induces a Com-PE in proper subgames of G j.
h1Lemma 2. For all h [H, C ,N and s [ S, if (s (t(h)), s ) is not a Com-PE then there exist B ,N,C
k h1k ,H and x [ S such that (x (t(k)), x ) is a Com-PE in g /s (t(k)) and eitherB 2B
h k k1. (i) k [H , k ± h, s 5 x and x s s or2B 2B B
k k2. (ii) k 5 h, B ,C, s 5 x and x s s .2B 2B B
Proof. If t 5 1, it comes from Lemma 2 in Greenberg (1989).
h h1If t . 1, that (s (t(h)), s ) is not a Com-PE in g /s (t(h)) means that eitherC 2C
k 1 k h(i9) the restriction of s in g (s ) is not a Com-PE in g with k ± h, k [H , or
1 h k k1(ii9) s is a Com-PE in g but there exist B ,C and x [ S such that (x , s ) s s and (x ,B B B 2B B B
hs ) is a Com-PE in g /s (t(h)).2B 2B
(i9) implies (i) by induction hypothesis and (ii9) implies (ii) by setting x 5 (x , s ).B 2B
Since this characterization of a Com-PE is not based on backward recursion, it can be used to
formulate a general definition covering both finit and infinit games (in the number of stages and
players).
Definitio 3. Consider a multi-stage game G with a finit or infinit number of players. A strategy
profil s is said to be a Com-PE of G if and only if there is an ASS, F, for the associated system (D,
s ) such that (N, G, s)[F.
Proposition 2. Let L and M be abstract stable sets of the abstract set (D, s ) associated with a finit
horizon game, as define above, then L 5M.
h h hi i11 iProof. Let h(C , g , s )j be an infinit sequence with (C , g , s )s (C , g , s ) for all i. Byi i i i11 i11 i i
finitenes of the sets of coalitions and histories and because the domination relation requires that either
hiC ,C or h [H , we have that, in the tail of the sequence, C 5C and h 5 h . This tail isi11 i i11 i11 i i11 i
clearly transitive. According to corollary 4b in Arce and Kahn (1991), this is a sufficien condition for
the uniqueness of the abstract stable set if it exists.
Proposition 2 cannot be generalized to infinit horizon games. Perhaps the simplest example to
show this is the following. Consider a game consisting of a set of h1, 2, . . . j lions, in this order. Each
lion can eat the lion before it (except lion 1, that can eat an antelope) or not. If he does not, the game
ends, but if he ate the lion before him (or the antelope), the next lion plays. Each lion prefers firs to
eat the antelope (directly or by eating the lion immediately before him if he ate the lion that ate the
lion . . . that ate the antelope) and not to be eaten, second to do nothing and third to be eaten (there is
no use in eating a lion that did not eat the antelope directly or indirectly). If there are n lions, there is
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a SPE that depends on whether n is even or odd. If n is even, odd numbered lions decide not to eat
and even numbered ones eat the previous lion only if he ate the lion that ate the lion . . . that ate the
antelope. If n is odd, it is the odd numbered who eat and the even numbered do not eat. If the number
of lions is infinite the two equilibria just described are two SPE (and Com-PE) belonging to different
abstract stable sets.
Finally, we compare Definitio 3 with that of PCoalition-PNE. For that defin a new abstract
k* * *system (D, s ) with D as before and with the domination relation s define by (B, g , y)s (C,
hg , s) if and only if
h k k(3) k [H , B ,C, s 5 y and y . s .2B 2B B
Definitio 4. (Asheim, 1991) Let G be a multi-stage game. A strategy s [ S is said to be a
*PCoalition-PNE of G if there exists an abstract stable set, F, for the associated system (D, s ) such
that (N, G, s)[F.
The differences between Com-PE and PCoalition-PNE are now clearer. Condition (3) is equivalent
to condition (2) when restricted to the stage where the deviation takes place. After the deviation is
known (k ± h), 3 is replaced with (1), the condition that allows for reactions against the deviation by
any subset of players.
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